

## SUMMARY

The first paper to be published in No. 3. 1974 of *Történelmi Szemle* is *Béla Bellér's* treatise on the development of the historical-political conception and historical image of the Dózsa-led-peasant war in pre-1945 Hungarian historiography.

1. For centuries, the historical-political image of the 1514 peasant war led by Dózsa had been determined by the contemporary historians' hatred of the peasants. The first historical approach was that of *Mátyás Bél*, at the beginning of the 18th century, who had stressed the historical origin of serfdom, emphasizing the humaneness of the serfs and their love of freedom. The representatives of critical historiography, *György Pray* and *István Katona* found new source. The rationalism of enlightenment and, later, the popular approach of romanticism can be observed in the works of J. Chr. von Engel and, even more, in the writings of I. A. Fessler. The old feudal conception was done away with by *Mihály Horváth*, the greatest personality in Hungarian liberal-nobiliar historiography. First, he pointed out the historical necessity of the outbreak of the peasant war, and he condemned the senseless bloody revenge of the nobility that had torn the nation into two, antagonistic camps. *László Szalay* formed his rather positivist view of the peasant war in the time of the neoabsolutism, that had followed the oppression of the 1848—49 war for liberty. According to *Szalay*, the peasant war was an anti-feudal class-struggle aiming at the liberation of the serfdom and at the extinction of the lords. He also regarded the fettering of the peasants as a historically fatal steps. The methodological achievements of positivism were also taken over by conservative historians, as *Vilmos Fraknói* and others. They disavowed a number of Sciences, but in the field of historical-political conception and historical image they left a meager heritage. The Dózsa-image of the liberal *Sándor Márki*, of the bourgeois-radical *Ignác Acsády* and of the social-democrat *Ervin Szabó* and *Sándor Csizmadia* were shaped by the intensifying mass-movements at the turn of the 19th—20th centuries. In the works of Ervin Szabó and Sándor Csizmadia we find a more or less established Marxist conception in the research of the Dózsa-problem for the first time. The greatest Dózsa-monograph ever was written by Márki. He completed the process of freeing Dózsa and his movement from the distortive interpretation rooting in feudal attitude. He relied upon a huge material in trying to understand Dózsa and his movement, however, his Dózsa-image does not tell us as much about the 16th century peasant-evolutionary us about the views of a the 19th century liberal reformer. The leading historians of the counter-revolutionary era (1919—1945) who were concerned with the history of ideas could not penetrate into the revolutionary substance of the peasants' war, as it is well shown by the synthesis of *Gyula Szekfű*. Some scholars could break this ideological barrier and their achievements deeply influenced the development of the Dózsa-research. According to *Elemér Mályusz*, the main force acting in the peasant revolution was the peasantry living in boroughs, who were hindered in their strive to rise, village peasantry being their only supporters. *István Szabó* arrived at the practically identical conclusion starting from the facts of the 15th century decay of farms, the emergence of the *puszta* (the word itself originally means a ruined, empty piece of land). The populist writers tried to work out an alternative against the peasant war conception of the historians of the ideas. The image of Dózsa in *Géza Féja's* book written in a colourful style is not one of a peasant revolutionary threatening with the annihilation of the whole feudalistic society but one of a reformer seeking cooperation with the nobility in order to defend the country, and, consequently, to heighten the people.

*Miklós Szabó's* paper analyzes the emergence of some new features in continental European conservative ideology, especially as it developed in Germany.

The unfolding of the workers' movement during the 1870's stimulated the revealal of theoretical conservatism in several European countries. In Central Europe, the economic crisis of 1873 was an added spur to this development. Contrary to the ideology of the conservative parties of the 1848—1870 period, this conservatism differed from the liberal parties not only in the *pace* it set for bourgeois development, but also in setting up the principle of conservatism as an alternative to liberalism. It is this new, bourgeois variety of conservatism which the paper calls *neo-conservatism*.

An essential feature of neo-conservatism was that it condemned as an anti-social practice the unrestricted competition espoused by the liberals, and counterposed instead the ideal of solidarity. As the practical realization of solidarity, it called for a program which represented the interests of the former noble, peasant, and petty-bourgeois strata who had fallen on evil days. As steps to the solution of the country's social problems, the neo-conservatives demanded the revision of the free enterprise system, and called on the government to initiate a social program. In short, it wanted a controlled economy to replace the liberals' competitive system of free enterprise.

Unlike its predecessors, neo-conservatism could, thus, regard itself not as a backward-looking political movement, but as a modern one offering alternative solutions to social problems which liberalism had failed to solve.

With this program, neo-conservatism tried to build up a mass movement, using the methods of mass-party organization and propaganda that had been developed by the workers' movement.

With the emergence of monopolistic capitalism and imperialism in the 1890's, the social basis of neo-conservatism also altered. For while the neo-conservatism of the 1870's had been concerned to present the former nobility as the leaders of a popular movement, from the 1890's, it was for the most self-conscious of the monopolistic bourgeoisie that elements of neo-conservatism became a means of „popular transmission”.

In the course of this metamorphosis, the terms „custom and tradition”, and „convention”, once used in neo-conservative ideology to describe genuine social phenomena, came to refer to a political myth. The paper examines this metamorphosis in terms of Tönnies' well-known pair of sociological opposites: *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. Tönnies meant by „*Gemeinschaft*” a culture based on a body of conventions, a culture he tried to describe in the hope of aiding its conservation. The ideology-building of the neo-conservatives of the turn of the century was an attempt to present as „*Gemeinschaft*” elements the overall structural forms of modern capitalistic society, elements which were, in fact, a set of „*Gesellschaft*” developments. More precisely, the neo-conservatives aimed at providing a political program which would indeed transform these structural forms into *Gemeinschaft* elements. The study dubs this ideological goal „conventionalism”.

In the course of this metamorphosis during the 1890's, neoconservative ideology coincided at some points with the goals of *nationalism*, a movement violently opposed by earlier conservatives. Against the liberal, state-centered nationalism of Western European capitalist countries, neo-conservatism set up an ideal borrowed from Romanticism, an *ethno-centric* nationalism which enabled it to find the alleged enemies of the nation not outside, but inside the country itself, within the ranks of the domestic opposition. It was this identification which enabled it to mobilise the emotional energies generated by nationalism for its own internal political struggles.

*Miklós Lachó's* paper deals with the draft political theses made by György Lukács at the end of the year 1928, the so-called Blum-theses. The draft theses are peculiar documents of the Hungarian workers' movement. They have been debated in party disputes for years, and they were in the centre of the 1928—30 campaign against „rightist opportunism” and „reconciliation”. The draft theses had remained practically unmentioned until 1956. The only exception was during the so-called „Lukács-debate” in 1949. The first public debate of the theses took place in the summer of 1956, a more detailed analysis followed during a discussion in 1963. In his memoirs (*Marxista fejlődésem: 1918—1930* [My Marxist Development: 1918—1930]) György Lukács described his period in which the Blum-theses were written as a transitional period of his own spiritual-political development from ultra-leftist revolutionarism to political realism. According to the author's opinion, we must accept the validity of Lukács' claim, according to which, at least as regards the tendency toward a democratic dictatorship, his views were „a theoretical summary of the practice of the party, or, rather, of one of the tendencies in the practice of the party. „The theses, however, also contain a deeper spiritual level which is the real link to Lukács's spiritual development. This is also an instance of Lukács's striving after the connection of practical political problems to great theoretical thoughts and, at the same time, after their insertion into his own spiritual development (his is a tendency that can be found in Révai's development as well, though in a much less marked form). With this striving in view, we must regard the Blum-theses as a last attempt to apply the Lukácsian practice-philosophy, an utopistic revolutionary philosophy in practical politics, a last attempt to reconcile a philosophy, that had been formulated at the beginning of the 1920s and of which only traces remained by 1928, with political reality. The failure of this attempt meant the termination of a long period in Lukács's life and, together with the turns of history, it gave a new impetus and direction to his life-course as well, towards the ideas described in „*Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*”.

The following parts of the study deal with the contents of the Blum-theses.

The most important parts of the theses are concerned with the perspective of world capitalism. Lukács sees its crisis not in economic troubles but in the political system: in the radically changed relationship between capitalism and democracy. He underlines that the primary task is to uncover the misleading nature of the question: „democracy or fascism?”. Then Lukács goes on to the theoretical arguments in favour of the necessity of a democratic dictatorship in Hungary. The author of the paper analyzes the draft theses' contents in order to prove that Lukács in fact, has two conceptions of „democratic dictatorship”: one applying to backward or moderately developed countries, meaning a dictatorship of the workers and peasants, and another conception of democratic dictatorship, applying to the developed modern Europe. However, Lukács intended to support the official political line of the communists, and, as if in turn, he called for a democratic alternative, provided by the communists, against the anti-democratism of capitalism: Lukács, rejecting the social-democratic alternative of fascism or democracy, pointed at the alternative of capitalism or democracy.

The author concludes his work by analyzing Béla Kun's criticism of the Blum-theses' which, while maintaining the program of the immediate establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, criticizes especially Lukács's conception of democracy. Finally, *Miklós Lackó* points out that the dispute which arose around the Blum-theses, was not simply a controversy between sectarianism and anti-sectarianism. It was closely connected with controversy between two types of sectarianism; those of Béla Kun's „conservative leftism” bearing on it the traces of a bureaucratic sectarianism, integrating a kind of a „political realism”, and the remains of a utopistic, messianistic sectarianism represented by Lukács, which also sought its way toward realism, and which was, by its nature, related to a longing for the workers' direct democracy.

In his study about historical inquiry and historico-political concepts, *Ferenc Glatz* analyses the early work of the greatest Hungarian bourgeois historian Gyula Szekfű. He tries to show the rôle of the strictly historical and the political elements in Szekfű's way of thinking. Ferenc Glatz wants to detect how the view of the historian on Hungarian history were shaped by the fact that he was an archivist of the Haus-Hof- und Stadtsarchiv and was in charge of the material of the Austro-Hungarian common affairs; how far his views on the recent — i.e. early twentieth-century — vital problems of the Hungarian people and at the same time his concept of history were determined by the loyal but anti-Gesamtmonarchie Hungarians living in Vienna and how these factors led Szekfű to a historico-political concept demanding a „wiser” representation if the Hungarian interests on the part of the nationalist leadership of the country. *Ferenc Glatz* looks also into the problem of how the young Szekfű's views on nation and state were influenced by his purely historical beliefs and his political ones formed against the background of the political atmosphere of the age and the cultural as well as political trends of Europe.

These problems are discussed in the study on the basis of material from Viennese and Hungarian archives.